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Power Lines: Climate Change and the  
Politics of Undergrounding 
DEBORAH BRUNDY†  
After years of enduring devastating loss of property and life, toxic air quality and intermittent 
power shutoffs, the public is primed for dramatic change to ensure a safe and resilient power 
grid. To achieve this, Californians are demanding that utilities bury the wires. As the court in 
Town of Tiburon v. Bonander emphasized over a decade ago, “it requires no independent 
research to support the self-evident conclusion that placing overhead utility wires underground 
will reduce the risk of weather-related power outages as well as the safety risk posed by downed 
utility poles and lines.”1 Wholesale undergrounding is not the cure-all to California’s megafires, 
but the evidence demonstrates that a wholesale review and revision of California’s regulatory 
system for permitting and implementing undergrounding is required. This Note brings together 
the available research on undergrounding in the backdrop of climate change and its social, 
environmental and economic impacts on California. The findings establish that a “holistic 
evaluation of costs and benefits” substantiates the public’s desire for undergrounding.2 The 
outsized benefit of lowering the risk and costs of megafires for the state and its citizens demands 
that California take action to cause utilities to underground power lines wherever feasible. 
   
 
 †  J.D. 2020, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. The Author would like to thank U.C. 
Hastings Research & Instruction Librarian Holly Herndon for her tireless research support, Professors Peter H. 
Schuck, Dave Owen, and David Takacs for their invaluable insight and feedback, and the Hastings Law Journal 
staff—particularly Andrew Klair, Samer Aref, Kendal Mitchell, Clare Moran, and Lauren Trambley. 
Additionally, this Note would not have been possible without the support of James Brundy and the incredible 
work of local, national, and international journalists covering California’s new abnormal.  
 1. 180 Cal. App. 4th 1057, 1079 (2009).  
 2. FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND 
THE VALUE OF NOTHING 210 (2004). Ackerman and Heinzerling advocate for an extension to the conventional 
cost-benefit analysis, proposing the incorporation of four principles for protection of public health and the 
environment: “holistic, rather than atomistic, methods of evaluating costs and benefits[;] [l]earn from the 
military: moral imperatives are more powerful than cost comparisons[;] [a]dopt a precautionary approach to 
uncertain, potentially dangerous risks[; and,] [p]romote fairness—toward the poor and powerless today, and 
toward future generations.” Id. 
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I.  THE NEW ABNORMAL 
In the aftermath of the recent megafires that engulfed California, which 
caused billions of dollars in damage and left devastating scars on communities 
across the state, Californians are demanding that state officials address the 
wildfire threat posed by overhead power lines.3 Ignitions from power lines and 
other outdated electrical equipment are responsible for nearly half of the state’s 
twenty most destructive fires.4 Between 2014 and 2017, equipment from 
California’s three largest investor-owned utilities (IOU), which provide power 
to the vast majority of the state, sparked over 2000 fires.5 Then in 2017 and 2018, 
California endured six of the ten most destructive fires in state history.6 
Undergrounding, the process of burying overhead power lines, would greatly 
lower the risk of fire.7 Despite the promise of undergrounding, however, many 
observers consider it exorbitantly expensive and, ultimately, cost prohibitive.8 
This Note focuses on Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (PG&E), California’s 
largest IOU and power provider, as its power lines span 70,000-square miles 
covering Northern and Central California.9 For years, opponents of PG&E have 
decried the company and argued that it should be customer-owned to ensure safe 
and reliable service.10 While sound leadership and governance are critical to 
providing safe service to millions of Californians, the more immediate issue is 
PG&E’s failing power grid infrastructure. Whoever leads PG&E in the future 
will bear the responsibility of hardening its vast network of distribution and 
transmission lines—nearly all of which are past their useful life.11 
 
 3. See, e.g., A.B. 281, 2019–2020 Gen. Assemb. (Cal. 2019); Letter from Staci Heaton, Senior Regulatory 
Affairs Advocate, Rural Cty. Representatives of Cal., to Caroline Thomas Jacobs, Dir., Wildfire Safety Div. 4 
(Apr. 6, 2020), ftp://ftp.cpuc.ca.ggov/WMP/PublicComments/ (follow “Joint Local Govts Comments 2020 
WMP.pdf” hyperlink). 
 4. Top 20 Most Destructive California Wildfires, CAL FIRE, http://www.fire.ca.gov/media/5511/top20 
_destruction.pdf (last visited June 28, 2020). 
 5. Taryn Luna, California Utility Equipment Sparked More than 2,000 Fires in Over Three Years, L.A. 
TIMES (Jan. 28, 2019, 12:05 AM), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-california-utilities-wildfires-
regulators-20190128-story.html. 
 6. Cal. Exec. Order N-05-19 (Jan. 8, 2019), https://www.gov.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/1.8.19-
EO-N-05-19.pdf. 
 7. David R. Baker, Underground Power Lines Don’t Start Wildfires. But They’re Really Expensive, S.F. 
CHRON. (Oct. 21, 2017), https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/Underground-power-lines-don-t-cause-
wildfires-12295031.php?psid=3moHS. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Company Profile, PG&E, https://www.pge.com/en_US/about-pge/company-information/profile/ 
profile.page (last visited June 28, 2020). 
 10. Rebecca Smith, San Jose to Propose Turning PG&E into Giant Customer-Owned Utility, WALL ST. J., 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/san-jose-to-propose-turning-pg-e-into-giant-customer-owned-utility-11571685117 
(last updated Oct. 21, 2019); see S.B. 917, 2019–2020 Leg. (Cal. 2020); Judy Lin, What Happens if California 
Takes Over PG&E?, CALMATTERS (Feb. 5, 2020), https://calmatters.org/politics/2020/02/what-happens-if-
california-takes-over-pge/ (“Gov. Gavin Newsom has threatened a public takeover of Pacific Gas & Electric 
unless it can transform into a provider of affordable, reliable, clean and—above all—safe energy.”). 
 11. Anne C. Mulkern, Options to Cut Wildfire Risk Include State Takeover of PG&E, E&E NEWS: 
CLIMATEWIRE (Jan. 27, 2020), https://www.eenews.net/climatewire/stories/1062188183 (“[I]f California took 
over PG&E’s system entirely . . . it would be responsible for future wildfire costs associated with PG&E lines. 
That could potentially affect the creditworthiness of the state.”). 
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This dying infrastructure is at the center of the megafires ravaging Northern 
California and needs to be rebuilt. California has an opportunity to build a power 
grid resilient to climate change by migrating the lines underground wherever 
possible. Yet, PG&E estimates the cost of migrating overhead distribution lines 
underground at around $3 million per mile.12 With approximately 81,000 miles 
of overhead distribution lines,13 this estimate would place the cost for 
undergrounding PG&E’s entire distribution network at roughly $243 billion.14 
Thus, conventional wisdom is that undergrounding is not a viable option to 
minimize California’s fire risk because of the steep sticker price. Adding 
credence to this assumption is that, while ratepayers may desire undergrounding, 
their tolerance for rate hikes to cover the costs of undergrounding is minimal.15 
The Edison Electric Institute (EEI), which represents all of the United States’ 
IOUs, released a report in 2012 that found that less than 10% of polled customers 
would be amenable to their bills increasing twofold, which EEI states is 
necessary to pay for the cost of undergrounding.16 
Given this resistance to undergrounding, there is little academic 
scholarship exploring the feasibility of undergrounding, particularly in 
California.17 This Note aims to augment that scholarship by analyzing the 
undergrounding of PG&E’s network in the context of California’s regulatory 
framework and climate change’s impact on the state. In response to the Camp 
Fire that destroyed Paradise, California, in 2018, then-Governor Jerry Brown 
famously stated that “[t]his is not the new normal, this is the new abnormal. And 
this new abnormal will continue, certainly in the next ten to fifteen to twenty 
years. And unfortunately, the best science is telling us that dryness, warmth, 
drought, all those things, they’re going to intensify.”18 Undergrounding is not 
the panacea to California’s wildfire risks, but it can no longer be written off as 
simply infeasible due to cost. Rather, the costs related to the new abnormal 
California faces dictate that the narrative around undergrounding must change. 
Treating undergrounding as an all-or-nothing solution, which makes 
undergrounding cost-prohibitive, is no longer relevant given the dramatic 
impacts of climate change on California’s environment. Indeed, the impacts of 
the new abnormal demonstrate that selective undergrounding is necessary for 
the creation of a resilient power grid. 
 
 12. Facts About Undergrounding Electric Lines, PG&E (Oct. 31, 2017), http://www.pgecurrents.com/ 
2017/10/31/facts-about-undergrounding-electric-lines/. 
 13. Id. 
 14. The author approximated this estimate by multiplying PG&E’s $3 million per mile estimate by 81,000.  
This estimate is meant as an illustration and should not be cited as the precise cost estimate for undergrounding 
all of PG&E’s above ground distribution network. 
 15. KENNETH L. HALL, EDISON ELECTRIC INST., OUT OF SIGHT, OUT OF MIND 2012: AN UPDATED STUDY 
ON THE UNDERGROUNDING OF OVERHEAD POWER LINES, at v (2012), http://www.eei.org/issuesandpolicy/ 
electricreliability/undergrounding/Documents/UndergroundReport.pdf. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Peter H. Larsen, A Method to Estimate the Costs and Benefits of Undergrounding Electricity 
Transmission and Distribution Lines, 60 ENERGY ECON. 47, 47 (2016). 
 18. Cal OES, Live: Emergency Officials Provide Wildfire Update at State Operations Center, YOUTUBE 
(Nov. 11, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hAVF-SWaPOQ&feature=emb_title. 
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Therefore, the debate around undergrounding should focus on the 
regulatory mechanisms necessary to ensure that selective undergrounding 
projects in high fire risk zones are prioritized and that project management best 
practices mitigate the cost and timelines of implementation. To facilitate this 
debate, this Note examines multiple issues: (1) It looks at how California’s new 
state of “abnormal” makes fires more destructive and appraises the attendant 
costs; (2) it reviews the California Public Utilities Commission’s (CPUC) 
Electric Rule 20 (Rule 20) program, which currently governs ratepayer funded 
undergrounding projects; (3) it attempts to determine the full costs of 
undergrounding and examines PG&E’s history with undergrounding; (4) it 
summarizes California’s legislative response to the megafires and PG&E’s 
Wildfire Mitigation Plan (WMP); and (5) it analyzes the feasibility of PG&E’s 
WMP achieving the state’s legislative aims. 
The analysis reveals that ensuring safe, reliable service that limits the risk 
of wildfire requires an overhaul of PG&E’s distribution line infrastructure. The 
data demonstrate that the preventive measures currently proposed by PG&E are 
woefully insufficient to provide the necessary resilience for withstanding the 
new abnormal.19 Rather, the realities of executing those measures indicate that 
undergrounding should be given a priority position in the mix of fire risk 
reduction strategies—above both vegetation management and de-energization 
measures—to ensure that the state’s largest power provider is able to deliver 
energy effectively. The impacts of climate change on California’s landscape 
now require that power grid infrastructure be moved underground, where 
feasible, particularly in high fire-threat zones to ensure the long-term health and 
safety of the state’s residents as well as their property. Furthermore, a resilient 
power grid is necessary to facilitate California’s shift away from fossil fuels to 
achieve the state’s ambitious goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 40% 
below 1990 levels by 2030.20 
A. DRIVERS OF THE NEW ABNORMAL 
1. Climate Change 
The new abnormal is a consequence of many factors, several of which stem 
from climate change. In the past decade, California has experienced some of its 
hottest years on record, resulting in a severe and protracted drought.21 The 
 
 19. See Out of Control: The Impact of Wildfires on our Power Sector and the Environment: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Energy & Subcomm. on Env’t & Climate Change of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 
116th Cong. 1–2 (2020) (testimony of William D. Johnson, Chief Executive Officer and President, PG&E Corp.) 
[hereinafter Hearing on Wildfires] (“[E]lectric transmission and distribution lines and related infrastructure are 
vulnerable to extreme weather conditions, including winds over 70 miles per hour.”). 
 20.  S.B. 32, 2015–2016 Leg. (Cal. 2016) (adding CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY § 38566).  
 21. CAL. OFFICE OF ENVTL. HEALTH HAZARD ASSESSMENT, INDICATORS OF CLIMATE CHANGE IN 
CALIFORNIA: REPORT SUMMARY 4 (2018), https://oehha.ca.gov/media/downloads/climate-change/report/ 
2018indicatorssummary.pdf (“The last four years were notably warm, with 2014 being the warmest on record, 
followed by 2015, 2017, and 2016.”). Id. at 5 (“Five of the eight years of severe to extreme drought . . . occurred 
between 2007 and 2016, with unprecedented dry years in 2014 and 2015. The record warmth from 2012 to 2016 
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warmed, parched environment, a concomitant effect of the drought, enabled a 
plague of bark beetles to attack weakened trees across the state,22 resulting in the 
death of nearly 150 million trees since 2010.23 Examining the causes of the new 
abnormal and increased scale of California’s wildfires, the California 
Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (“CAL FIRE”) found that: the fire 
season is now more than two months longer than historical data show, and that 
“reduced snowpack, and earlier spring snowmelt create longer and more intense 
dry seasons that increase moisture stress on vegetation . . . .”24 The “unusually 
warm temperatures intensif[y] the effects of very low precipitation and 
snowpack and create[] conditions for extreme, high severity wildfires that spread 
rapidly.”25 Moreover, the state’s “forests and woodlands are responding to 
climate change” with an increase in growth of smaller trees and oak trees, which 
provide fuel for wildfires.26 
2. Forest Management 
While climate change is responsible for many of the conditions that fuel 
wildfires, the state’s and federal government’s forest management practices 
have intensified the scale of devastation. Research indicates that “[a] century of 
aggressive fire suppression and decades of restricted timber harvesting have 
resulted in an unnatural accumulation of fuels on many California forestlands. 
Where 50–70 trees per acre stood before the Gold Rush, California forests now 
average over 400 trees per acre.”27 Overgrown forests increase fire fuel supply 
and prevent snowfall from being added to the snowpack, which is a critical 
component of the state’s water supply system “and is expected to decline as a 
result of rising temperatures.”28 In response to Governor Gavin Newsom’s 
directive under Executive Order N-05-19 to recommend “administrative, 
regulatory and policy changes . . . necessary to prevent and mitigate wildfires to 
the greatest extent possible, with an emphasis on environmental sustainability 
and protection of public health,”29 CAL FIRE reviewed its policies and found 
that “California’s forest management efforts have not kept pace with these 
growing [climate change-related] threats.”30 In fact, evaluation of California’s 
 
coincided with consecutive dry years, including a year of record low snowpack, leading to the most extreme 
drought since instrumental records began in 1895.”). 
 22. FOREST SERVS., USDA, BARK BEETLES IN CALIFORNIA CONIFERS: ARE YOUR TREES SUSCEPTIBLE? 1 
(2015), https://www.fs.usda.gov/Internet/FSE_DOCUMENTS/stelprdb5384837.pdf. 
 23. Hearing on Wildfires, supra note 19, at 1. 
 24. See CAL. DEP’T OF FORESTRY & FIRE PROT., COMMUNITY WILDFIRE PREVENTION & MITIGATION 
REPORT: IN RESPONSE TO EXEC. ORDER N-05-19, at 4 (2019), https://www.fire.ca.gov/media/5584/45-day-
report-final.pdf. 
 25. CAL. OFFICE OF ENVTL. HEALTH HAZARD ASSESSMENT, supra note 21, at 9.  
 26. Id. 
 27. Christopher Dicus, Fire on the Landscape: Current Policies and a Changing Climate Lead Toward 
Higher Costs, More Severe Wildfire, 13 CAL. FORESTS 16, 16 (2009). 
 28. S.B. 901 § 1(c), 2017–2018 Leg. (Cal. 2018). 
 29. Cal. Exec. Order N-05-19 (Jan. 8, 2019), https://www.gov.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/1.8.19-
EO-N-05-19.pdf. 
 30. CAL. DEP’T OF FORESTRY & FIRE PROT., supra note 24, at 4. 
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forests indicates that fifteen million acres require care and that the current levels 
of state, federal, and private forest management are “inadequate to improve the 
health of millions of acres of forests and wildlands,”31 which is necessary to 
mitigate the intensity and frequency of wildfires. 
3. Land Use Practices 
Increased development within these vulnerable forests is another important 
factor.32 Communities in the wildland-urban interface (WUI), defined by CAL 
FIRE as “[t]he line, area, or zone where structures and other human development 
meet or intermingle with undeveloped wildland or vegetative fuels,”33 face the 
greatest risk. Building in this transition zone, areas naturally susceptible to 
wildfires, greatly increases the risk of fire.34 Yet, between 1990 and 2010, 
roughly a million homes were built in California WUIs.35 WUIs span a wide-
range of communities from Bay Area cities like Berkeley to rural communities 
that dot the foothills of the Sierra Nevada to metropolitan areas between Los 
Angeles and Orange counties.36 Additionally, exposure to fire has not deterred 
residents from rebuilding in WUIs.37 From 1970 to 2009, “49 percent of burned 
buildings [in California] were rebuilt within six years,” according to United 
States Forest Service researcher Miranda H. Mockrin.38 Although homes built 
after 1991 must meet the nation’s strictest fire regulations, the average California 
home dates from the 1950s.39 Therefore, a significant portion of the population 
lives in homes vulnerable to fire risk. 
Paradise, California, is representative of a WUI community that endured 
the horrific effects of wildfire-related devastation. Founded in the late 1800s, the 
town is nestled in the forests of the Sierra Nevada foothills.40 The town’s 
population of nearly 27,000 was composed of retirees and those looking for a 
more affordable alternative to California’s expensive coastal cities and towns.41 
In recent years, like many other California towns, Paradise developed further 
and further into overgrown forested areas with little fire planning or zoning 
 
 31. Id. 
 32. Kendra Pierre-Louis & Jeremy White, Americans Are Moving Closer to Nature, and to Fire Danger, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/15/climate/california-fires-wildland-urban-
interface.html. 
 33. CAL. DEP’T OF FORESTRY & FIRE PROT., supra note 24, at 20. 
 34. Pierre-Louise & White, supra note 32. 
 35. Id. 
 36. See id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Kirk Siegler, “Reimaging Paradise”—Making Plans to Rebuild a Town Destroyed by Wildfire, NPR 
(Mar. 7, 2019, 9:29 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/03/07/700825538/re-imagining-paradise-making-plans-to-
rebuild-a-town-destroyed-by-wildfire. 
 41. Id.; Dale Kasler & Ryan Lillis, Paradise Will “Rise from the Ashes” After Camp Fire. Is That a Good 
Idea?, SACRAMENTO BEE (Dec. 16, 2018, 12:00 PM), https://www.sacbee.com/news/california/fires/ 
article222900130.html. 
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forethought.42 In 2013, Butte County, where Paradise is situated, estimated that 
99% of “Paradise residents lived in areas facing a very high risk of wildfire.”43 
In fact, the community weathered twelve fires in nearly twenty-years before the 
Camp Fire destroyed 90% of Paradise, tragically claiming eighty-five lives and 
razing close to 19,000 structures.44 
In calling for reducing fire risk, former CAL FIRE Director and thirty-year 
veteran of the force, Ken Pimlott stressed that “[w]e have hundreds of 
communities like Paradise all over the state” and “[against] a fire that’s burning 
like a blowtorch . . . our way of fighting fire isn’t going to work.”45 Indeed, 
Paradise is one of 1329 WUI communities designated as high fire risk in 
California.46 Mr. Pimlott recommended officials consider prohibiting 
development in these fire prone areas; because, even though California “has the 
nation’s most robust building requirement programs for new homes in fire-prone 
areas,” they have not been sufficient to stave off wildfire risk as megafires have 
only grown in size and frequency.47 Rather than prohibiting development in 
WUIs as a fire reduction measure, the state should consider requiring 
undergrounding of power lines, wherever feasible, in these communities to 
remove a frequent source of wildfire ignition.  
B. THE NEW ABNORMAL’S COST 
The overall cost of the new abnormal justifies the expense of 
undergrounding. As the atmosphere continues to warm towards 1.5 degrees 
Celsius (“1.5C”) (2.7 degrees Fahrenheit) above pre-1990 levels, the country 
and world will increasingly experience more dangerous natural disasters.48 The 
U.S. Global Change Research Program reports that “[m]ore frequent and intense 
extreme weather and climate-related events, as well as changes in average 
climate conditions, are expected to continue to damage infrastructure, 
ecosystems, and social systems that provide essential benefits to 
communities.”49 In the past few years, communities in the United States have 
experienced natural disasters on a scale not previously seen, such as massive 
 
 42. Siegler, supra note 40.  
 43. Kasler & Lillis, supra note 41.  
 44. Siegler, supra note 40. 
 45. Steve Schoonover, Feds Make Push for More Forest Management After Camp Fire, CHICO 
ENTERPRISE-RECORD, https://www.chicoer.com/2018/11/26/feds-make-push-for-more-forest-management/ (last 
updated Nov. 26, 2018). 
 46. Communities at Risk List, CAL FIRE, https://osfm.fire.ca.gov/divisions/wildfire-planning-
engineering/fire-plan/communities-at-risk / (last visited June 28, 2020). 
 47. Don Thompson, Official: California Must Mull Home Ban in Fire-Prone Areas, CHI. TRIBUNE (Dec. 
11, 2018, 2:52 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-california-fires-home-ban-20181 
211-story.html. 
 48. U.N. Env’t Programme & World Meteorological Org., Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
[IPCC], IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C: Summary for Policymakers 9 (Valérie Masson-
Delmotte et al. eds., 2018), https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/10/SR15_SPM_version_stand_ 
alone_LR.pdf. 
 49. U.S. GLOB. CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT: SUMMARY 
FINDINGS 25 (2018), https://nca2018.globalchange.gov/downloads/NCA4_Ch01_Summary-Findings.pdf. 
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mudslides, vast flooding, ruinous hurricanes, and deadly wildfires.50 The 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration reports that in 2019 alone, 
fourteen climate-related catastrophes led to losses exceeding $1 billion each 
across the United States “with a total cost of $45.0 billion.”51 Moreover, 2017 
was the “costliest year on record for natural disasters in the United States, with 
a price tag of at least $306 billion.”52 
1. The New Abnormal’s Impact on California’s Economy and Public 
Welfare 
Calculating the full costs of California’s wildfires requires extending the 
costs reflected in the conventional cost benefit analysis to include the broader 
impacts on society. Insurers have already paid out over $24 billion in losses 
related to the 2017 and 2018 fires in California,53 and damage from the 2019 
fires is estimated at $25.4 billion.54 Yet, these totals likely significantly 
underestimate the full scale of economic losses from the wildfires.55 For 
instance, more and more private insurers are refusing to issue policies for 
wildfire prone areas, which exacerbates the state’s housing crisis by adding 
expensive government and wrap-around insurance costs to already steep housing 
prices.56 Additionally, unreliable power threatens California’s economy as 
technology companies that require massive amounts of power for their 
operations may move to other states, taking with them their share of the state’s 
revenues from the innovation economy.57 The fires and unreliable power also 
pose severe threats to tourism as well as California’s wine industry and its “$57.6 
 
 50. Umair Irfan & Brian Resnick, Megadisasters Devastated America in 2017. And They’re Only Going to 
Get Worse, VOX, https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2017/12/28/16795490/natural-disasters-2017-
hurricanes-wildfires-heat-climate-change-cost-deaths (last updated Mar. 26, 2018); Tens of Millions Face 
Flooding Threat Across Midwest, CBS NEWS (Sept. 3, 2018, 7:56 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ 
flooding-threat-midwest-today-2018-09-03/. 
 51. NAT’L CTRS. FOR ENVTL. INFO., NAT’L OCEANIC ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., Billion-Dollar Weather and 
Climate Disasters: Time Series, https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/billions/time-series (last visited June 28, 2020). 
 52. Irfan & Resnick, supra note 50. 
 53. Nicole Friedman, High Cost of Wildfire Insurance Hurts California Home Sales, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 5, 
2020, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/high-cost-of-wildfire-insurance-hurts-california-home-sales-
11578220200. 
 54. Nic Querolo & Brian K. Sullivan, California Fire Damage Estimated at $25.4 Billion, BLOOMBERG, 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-10-28/california-fire-damages-already-at-25-4-billion-and-
counting (last updated Oct. 29, 2019).  
 55. For a detailed account, see Figure 6 captioned “The Protection Gap Has Widened Over Time.” Storms, 
Wildfires and Floods: How Climate Change Amplifies Insurance Risk, SWISS RE GROUP (Apr. 7, 2020), 
https://www.swissre.com/risk-knowledge/mitigating-climate-risk/how-climate-change-amplifies-insurance-
risk.html. 
 56. Id. While the State placed a moratorium on insurers dropping homes in high-risk fire zones, the 
moratorium only applies to existing policies and does not ease the barrier to entry for new home purchases. 
Nicole Friedman, California Bans Insurers from Dropping Homes in Wildfire Areas, WALL ST. J., 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/california-bans-insurers-from-dropping-homes-in-wildfire-areas-11575585626? 
mod=article_inline (last updated Dec. 5, 2019). 
 57. J.D. Morris, PG&E Electricity Rates Could Double After More Wildfires, Report Says, S.F. CHRON., 
https://www.sfchronicle.com/business/article/California-electricity-rates-could-surge-50-13757757.php 
(last updated Apr. 11, 2019). 
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billion state economic impact.”58 Furthermore, the megafires pose great health 
risks, not only to those in the line of fire but also to those in the surrounding 
region who are susceptible to respiratory illness as a result of impacted air 
quality,59 potentially stressing California’s public health system and causing 
unnecessary loss of life. It is estimated that nearly 340,000 people worldwide 
die annually from wildfire smoke.60 Forebodingly, the U.S. Forest Service 
estimates that “[b]y 2050 . . . wildfires will be twice as destructive as they are 
today; in some places, the area burned could grow fivefold,”61 indicating that 
wildfire costs borne by society will only increase. 
In addition to the health, insurance, and economic costs associated with 
megafires, California is also managing the implications of PG&E’s bankruptcy 
filing.62 In January 2019, PG&E filed a defensive bankruptcy to limit its 
“estimated $30 billion or more in liabilities” stemming from recent megafires.63 
In response to the filing, Governor Newsom issued a statement declaring that 
PG&E’s choice to seek reorganization in bankruptcy court did not alter his 
commitment to ensuring “that Californians have access to safe, reliable and 
affordable service, that victims and employees are treated fairly, and that 
California continues to make forward progress on our climate change goals.”64 
However, achieving these goals may prove impossible without rebuilding 
PG&E’s infrastructure to withstand the new abnormal. 
2. The New Abnormal’s Impact on Climate Change Policy 
In a letter to Ana Matosantos, Governor Newsom’s Cabinet Secretary, 
Steven Weissman, a lecturer at U.C. Berkeley’s Goldman School of Public 
Policy, stressed that electric rates could “skyrocket . . . by 50%” as a result of 
 
 58. Media & Trade, CAL. WINE INST., https://discovercaliforniawines.com/media-trade/statistics/ (last 
visited June 28, 2020); see also Vivian Ho, After the Wildfires: Tourist Firms in California’s Wine Country Say 
No One Is Coming, GUARDIAN (Feb. 8, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/feb/08/ 
guerneville-wine-country-climate-crisis-business; Ester Mobley, Wildfires and Wine Country: How the Industry 
Is Adapting to New Realities, S.F. CHRON., www.sfchronicle.com/wine/article/Wildfires-and-Wine-Country-
How-the-Industry-is-14563760.php (last updated Oct. 28, 2019). 
 59. U.S. GLOB. CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 49, at 27. 
 60. David Wallace-Wells, The Uninhabitable Earth, N.Y. MAG.: INTELLIGENCER (July 10, 2017), 
http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2017/07/climate-change-earth-too-hot-for-humans.html. 
 61. Id. 
 62. See PG&E Bankruptcy, CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/pgechapter11 (last visited 
June 28, 2020); PG&E Corporation and Pacific Gas and Electric Company, U.S. BANKR. CT., N.D. CAL., 
http://www.canb.uscourts.gov/case-info/pge-corporation-and-pacific-gas-and-electric-company (last visited 
June 28, 2020). 
 63. G. Marcus Cole, Stanford Law’s Marcus Cole on PG&E Bankruptcy: No Free Lunches, STAN. L. SCH. 
BLOGS: LEGAL AGGREGATE (Mar. 1, 2019), https://law.stanford.edu/2019/03/01/stanford-laws-marcus-cole-on-
the-pge-bankruptcy/; Peter Eavis & Ivan Penn, Can PG&E Survive the California Wildfires?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/29/business/energy-environment/pge-bankruptcy.html. As part of 
its bankruptcy proceeding, PG&E reached a $13.5 billion settlement with fire victims and plead guilty to 
involuntary manslaughter charges arising from the Camp Fire. Ivan Penn & Peter Eavis, PG&E Will Plead Guilty 
to Involuntary Manslaughter in Camp Fire, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/23/ 
business/energy-environment/pge-camp-fire-manslaughter.html.  
 64. Press Release, Gavin Newsom, Governor of California, Governor Newsom Statement on PG&E 
Bankruptcy Filing (Jan. 29, 2019), https://www.gov.ca.gov/2019/01/29/pge-bankruptcy-filing/. 
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the liabilities accrued from the 2017 and 2018 wildfires.65 Mr. Weissman warned 
that such a dramatic increase in cost to the consumer would make accomplishing 
the state’s 2030 emissions reductions goals impossible because increasing the 
cost of electricity may lead customers to not use electric cars or convert to 
electric appliances and heating, which are critical components of the state’s 
climate change policies.66 In an interview with the San Francisco Chronicle, Mr. 
Weissman underscored that “if the expectation is that, on an ongoing basis, 
ratepayers are going to be covering the costs of these wildfires if they’re 
triggered by utilities, that is going to make it far more challenging to try to 
accomplish a significant conversion from using fossil fuels to using 
electricity.”67 
Adding to California’s challenges for meeting its greenhouse gas reduction 
goals are the smoke emissions from megafires, which contribute a shocking 
amount of black carbon, a short-lived climate pollutant, to the atmosphere.68 For 
example, CAL FIRE found that “[t]he 2013 Rim Fire, which burned 257,000 
acres [near Yosemite], generated roughly 15 million metric tons of greenhouse 
gas emissions, as much pollution as 2.3 million vehicles generate in a given 
year.”69 It is estimated that emissions from a single year of statewide wildfires, 
roughly twenty-five million tons, can negate the transportation fuel carbon 
reduction gains of the next decade.70 Furthermore, wildfires that destroy forests 
damage a critical carbon sink supporting the state’s climate change response.71 
The legislature found that unless meaningful change is made to the status quo to 
“reduce[] the risk and intensity of wildfires,” achievement of the state’s 
greenhouse gas emission reduction programs will be impossible.72 Taking into 
account the full costs of wildfires shows that, given the imperative to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions and the ongoing impact wildfires have on public 
health, well-being and the economy, it is time to change the way the state 
approaches fire management. The steep upfront cost of undergrounding should 
not be permitted to stand in the way of the significant long-term benefits and 
savings achievable by avoiding the exorbitant costs incurred from wildfires year 
after year. 
 
 65. Memorandum from Steven Weissman, Lecturer, U.C. Berkeley’s Goldman Sch. of Pub. Policy, to Ana 
Matosantos, Cabinet Sec’y for Governor Gavin Newsom, The Massive Costs of the “New Normal” in Wildfires 
& Climate Change Era (Apr. 10, 2019), https://gspp.berkeley.edu/news/news-center/the-massive-cost-of-the-
new-normal-in-wildfires-climate-change-era. 
 66. Id.; see also S.B. 350, 2015–2016 Leg. (Cal. 2015); CAL. AIR RES. BD., CALIFORNIA’S 2017 CLIMATE 
CHANGE SCOPING PLAN 74 (2017), https://ww3.arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/scoping_plan_2017.pdf. 
 67. Morris, supra note 57. 
 68. See S.B. 901 § 1(e), 2017–2018 Leg. (Cal. 2018).  
 69. Id. § 1(f). 
 70. Id. 
 71. CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, STATE AGENCY GREENHOUSE GAS REDUCTION REPORT CARD tbl.3-1 
(2018), https://www.energy.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2019-12/2018_CalEPA_Report_Card.pdf. 
 72. S.B. 901 § 1(f).  
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C. AUSTRALIA’S WILDFIRES: A PORTENT FOR CALIFORNIA 
California has yet to determine the final costs of the megafires, but the 
California Department of Insurance announced that the 2018 wildfires “were the 
world’s most expensive natural disasters, with more than $12 billion in total 
insured losses reported to date.”73 This determination was made prior to the 
2019–2020 Australian wildfires, the immense scale of which is a forceful 
warning for California.74 Where the 2018 California fires burned 1.7 million 
acres, the Australian bush fires burned roughly 30 million acres.75 Professor Rob 
Jackson of Stanford University predicts that “emissions from this fire season 
will be close to a billion tons of carbon dioxide by the time the bush fires are 
finally extinguished,”76 which is twice the amount of Australia’s annual 
emissions from all other sources.77 The Met Office, the United Kingdom’s 
national meteorological service, expects that “[e]missions from the Australian 
bushfires will make up one-fifth” of the world’s annual increase in carbon 
emissions, pushing the “world closer to 1.5C of global heating.”78 Horrifically, 
Professor Chris Dickman, an ecologist at the University of Sydney’s Faculty of 
Science, estimates that the fires have killed more than one billion animals.79 
Finally, the impact of the haze caused by the wildfires on Sydney’s economy is 
calculated to be between $12 million and $50 million in Australian dollars per 
day.80 Without significant action to reduce California’s wildfire risk, the state 
may be vulnerable to fire of the magnitude suffered by Australia. If the state 
were to endure a burn of 30 million acres, the losses would be staggering and 
may easily rival the $243 billion estimate for undergrounding PG&E’s entire 
distribution network. 
 
 73. Press Release, Cal. Dep’t of Ins., Insurance Commissioners Visit Site of California’s Most Destructive 
Wildfire During Risk and Resilience Summit (May 2, 2019), http://www.insurance.ca.gov/0400-news/0100-
press-releases/2019/release036-19.cfm. 
 74. Ed Johnson, Australia’s Wildfire Crisis: Key Numbers Behind the Disaster, BLOOMBERG, 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-01-02/australia-s-wildfire-crisis-key-numbers-behind-the-
disaster (last updated Jan. 15, 2020); Amy Corderoy & Lisa Cox, Counting the Cost of Australia’s Summer of 
Dread, GUARDIAN (Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/ng-interactive/2020/feb/11/ 
counting-the-cost-of-australias-summer-of-dread. 
 75. Johnson, supra note 74. 
 76. Andrew Freedman, Australia’s Greenhouse Gas Emissions Effectively Double as a Result of 
Unprecedented Bush Fires, WASH. POST (Jan. 24, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/weather/2020/01/ 
24/australia-bush-fires-have-nearly-doubled-countrys-annual-greenhouse-gas-emissions/. 
 77. Denise Chow, Australia Wildfires Unleash Millions of Tons of Carbon Dioxide, NBC NEWS (Jan. 22, 
2020, 10:57 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/science/environment/australia-wildfires-unleash-millions-tons-
carbon-dioxide-n1120186. 
 78. Fiona Harvey, Australian Bushfires Will Cause Jump in CO2 in Atmosphere, Say Scientists, GUARDIAN 
(Jan. 23, 2020, 7:01 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2020/jan/24/australian-bushfires-will-
cause-jump-in-co2-in-atmosphere-say-scientists. 
 79. More than One Billion Animals Killed in Australian Bushfires, UNIV. SYDNEY (Jan. 8, 2020), 
https://sydney.edu.au/news-opinion/news/2020/01/08/australian-bushfires-more-than-one-billion-animals-
impacted.html#.XhWtKc7PatE.whatsapp. 
 80. Tim McDonald, Australia Fires: The Huge Economic Cost of Australia’s Bushfires, BBC (Dec. 20, 
2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-50862349. 
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II. UNDERGROUNDING: A POTENTIAL SOLUTION 
A. THE INHERENT RISK OF OVERHEAD POWER LINES 
Electrical systems are a complex network of transmission, distribution, and 
service lines.81 Power is provided through transmission lines, which transmit 
electricity from a power generation facility to sub-stations.82 Distribution lines 
then carry the electricity from sub-stations to a transformer.83 Service lines then 
transfer that electricity to the consumer by transmission of power from the 
transformer to the customer’s weather-head, the entry point for service to a 
building.84 While providing a necessary service, this technology is vulnerable to 
fire and a common source of ignition for major fires.85 A 2016 report on the 
causes of wildland fires, by the National Wildfire Coordinating Group,86 found 
that sources of power line fire ignition include: high winds; equipment failure; 
contact with vegetation, either as a result of inadequate clearances for standing 
vegetation or other vegetation on the ground;87 contact with animals and litter; 
and poor equipment maintenance and cleaning.88 Furthermore, distribution 
networks are a more likely cause of fire than transmission lines, because 
distribution networks are closer to vegetation.89 
The circumstances surrounding an ignition depend on its source. For 
example, fires stemming from conductor failure occur when power poles, 
linking lines together, break and fall to the ground allowing the lines to arc.90 In 
other instances, although regulations require utilities to account for line sag in 
high temperatures and wind conditions, these circumstances cause numerous fire 
ignitions.91 Additionally, a fire may ignite due to the re-energizing of a line after 
a manual or automatic re-closure of the line or due to an arc caused by contact 
with birds.92 Further risk is posed by insulators, the large coils attached to 
conductors, which can erupt in fire due to failures from a variety of factors 
ranging from dirt and bird manure to high humidity and lightning strikes.93 
 
 81. NAT’L WILDFIRE COORDINATING GRP., GUIDE TO WILDLAND FIRE ORIGIN AND CAUSE 
DETERMINATION 245 (2016), https://www.nwcg.gov/sites/default/files/publications/pms412.pdf. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 246. 
 85. Id. at 245. 
 86. Members of the National Wildfire Coordinating Group include: Bureau of Indian Affairs (U.S. 
Department of the Interior), Bureau of Land Management (U.S. Department of the Interior), Fish and Wildlife 
Service (U.S. Department of the Interior), Forest Service (U.S. Department of Agriculture), International 
Association of Fire Chiefs, Intertribal Timber Council, National Association of State Foresters, National Park 
Service (U.S. Department of the Interior), United States Fire Administration (Federal Emergency Management 
Agency). The National Wildfire Coordinating Group, NAT’L WILDFIRE COORDINATING GRP., https://www. 
nwcg.gov/ (last visited June 28, 2020). 
 87. NAT’L WILDFIRE COORDINATING GRP., supra note 81. 
 88. Id. at 246. 
 89. Id. at 245–46. 
 90. Id. at 248. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 251–52. 
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A review of 414 incidents, reported from 2015 to 2017 in PG&E’s high 
fire-threat districts,94 found power line and equipment failure accounted for the 
vast majority of ignitions.95 Dry vegetation and the failure of conductors and 
connectors, or hardware and other equipment failures accounted for 49% and 
28% of ignitions, respectively.96 In contrast, third-party contact constituted 13% 
of ignitions and animals caused 8% of ignitions.97 Finally, unknown ignitions, 
defined by PG&E as, “situations where PG&E was unable to determine the 
cause of ignition,” but “it appeared that the ignition may have been attributable 
to PG&E facilities” represented 3% of ignitions.98 
The high risk of fire due to power line and equipment failure underscores 
the imperative for utilities to vigilantly monitor their distribution, transmission, 
and service line systems. Yet, in investigating the causes of the Camp Fire, the 
CPUC found that PG&E systematically failed to adequately inspect its lines.99 
The company regularly deferred maintenance on its oldest lines and failed to 
climb towers to inspect equipment not visible from the ground.100 Confirming 
this failure, PG&E’s Chief Executive Officer, William Johnson, acknowledged 
in recent testimony to the House of Representatives’ sub-committees on Energy 
and Environment and Climate Change that in 2019 PG&E undertook “an 
unprecedented process to inspect every element of our electric system within 
the high fire-threat areas.”101 
While the company has now reviewed “almost 750,000 transmission, 
distribution and substation structures and over 25 million electrical components 
in those areas”102 much of its grid remains past its useful life. PG&E estimates 
that “the average age of its towers [i]s 68 years, but the mean life expectancy 
[i]s only 65 years.”103 The Caribou-Palermo transmission line, which sparked 
the Camp Fire, has been operating since 1921.104 When the company requested 
to replace the Caribou-Palermo line’s wires, it declined to update the line’s 
towers, indicating that PG&E may adhere to the notion of running equipment to 
 
 94. See FireMap, CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, https://ia.cpuc.ca.gov/firemap/ (last visited June 28, 2020). 
 95. PAC. GAS & ELEC. CO., PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY’S WILDFIRE MITIGATION PLAN 26–27 
(2019), http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Efile/G000/M263/K673/263673423.PDF. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 26. 
 99. Russel Gold & Katherine Blunt, PG&E Had Systemic Problems with Power Line Maintenance, 
California Probe Finds, WALL ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/articles/pg-e-had-systemic-problems-with-power-
line-maintenance-california-probe-finds-11575338873 (last updated Dec. 3, 2019, 12:27 PM); see also PAC. 
GAS & ELEC. CO. ET AL., JOINT MOTION OF PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY (U 39 E), THE SAFETY AND 
ENFORCEMENT DIVISION OF THE CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION, COALITION OF CALIFORNIA 
UTILITY EMPLOYEES, AND THE OFFICE OF THE SAFETY ADVOCATE FOR APPROVAL OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
(2019), https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/uploadedFiles/CPUCWebsite/Content/News_Room/NewsUpdates/2019/I.19-
06-015_Joint%20Motion%20for%20Approval%20of%20Settlement%20Agmt_12-17-19PDFA.pdf. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Hearing on Wildfires, supra note 19, at 3 (emphasis added). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Gold & Blunt, supra note 99. 
 104. Id. 
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failure before replacing it.105 Adding to the danger posed by outdated equipment 
is the fact that much of PG&E’s service area is situated among roughly 100 
million trees “with the potential to grow into or fall into the lines.”106 Thus, the 
risk of overhead power line ignition combined with the force-multipliers of 
climate change, dead and at-risk vegetation, and development in the WUI, 
emphasize that current fire prevention systems for overhead power lines are not 
sufficient.107 
B. TAKING ADVANTAGE OF UNDERGROUNDING 
Undergrounding is not a silver bullet for wildfires; but the days of blindly 
accepting that it is cost prohibitive, and therefore a non-starter, are over. The 
new abnormal requires a holistic approach to cost-benefit analysis rather than an 
“atomistic and reductionist approach adopted in the dominant style of Cost-
Benefit Analysis.”108 This is because the holistic approach responds to the 
“nature of the risks involved, the questions of fairness and distribution of 
burdens, and the importance of providing for the future, [which] all affect the 
policies that should be adopted to protect health and the environment.”109 Not 
all of the system can or should be migrated underground, but there are high-risk 
areas where investment in undergrounding of distribution lines would save the 
state massive losses of life, health, and property.110 
The benefits of undergrounding outweigh the costs. Noted benefits include: 
(1) robustness to most weather events, (2) less exposure to wildlife and trees, (3) 
increased reliability during high winds and storms, (4) easier obtainment of an 
easement, and (5) better public safety.111 Significantly, undergrounding removes 
the entire cost of vegetation management.112 However, key costs of 
undergrounding include: (1) the expense of installation, (2) higher replacement 
costs, (3) increased material costs and longer installation timeframes, (4) 
increased repair times, and (5) susceptibility of the system to damage from those 
digging improperly.113 While the costs associated with undergrounding are 
mostly related to labor, and therefore can be held to a minimum through skillful 
project management, utilities cannot replicate the benefits associated with 
undergrounding any other way. Utilities should take the opportunity to move 
towards undergrounding as their primary means to remove most of the ignition 
 
 105. Ivan Penn et al., How PG&E Ignored Fire Risks in Favor of Profits, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/03/18/business/pge-california-wildfires.html. 
 106. PAC. GAS & ELEC. CO., supra note 95, at 19. 
 107. CAL. DEP’T OF FORESTRY & FIRE PROT., supra note 24, at 4. 
 108. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 2, at 211. 
 109. Id. at 212–13. 
 110. See J.D. Morris, Put PG&E’s Power Lines Underground? It Can Be Done—Expensively and Slowly, 
S.F. CHRON., https://www.sfchronicle.com/california-wildfires/article/Put-PG-E-s-power-lines-underground-It-
can-be-14565060.php (last updated Oct. 27, 2019). Undergrounding is not appropriate in areas susceptible to 
earthquake or flooding. Id.  
 111. HALL, supra note 15, at 25. 
 112. Id. at 26. 
 113. Id. 
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risks associated with overhead distribution lines and maximize the resilience of 
their networks. 
To facilitate an increase in the use of undergrounding, Governor Newsom 
should convene a commission of experts tasked specifically with developing a 
regulatory framework for carrying out undergrounding projects efficiently and 
expeditiously. Nearly 85% of the cost of undergrounding is related to digging 
trenches and repairing infrastructure damaged by that digging,114 and the 
average timeline for an undergrounding project is five to seven years.115 
However, streamlined permitting processes and best practices for project 
implementation could greatly mitigate costs. To expedite projects, third-party 
contractors could be utilized instead of relying entirely on utility employees. As 
California counties argue, “[i]f local governments are able to perform the work 
themselves, or if a private company can be selected through a competitive 
solicitation, local governments will not be dependent on the IOUs’ schedule and 
constraints.”116 Undergrounding PG&E’s network offers the state a major jobs 
creation opportunity that can be used to revitalize local economies by supporting 
third-party businesses and local municipalities.117 Furthermore, an increased 
focus on undergrounding over vegetation management would allow the Forest 
Management Task Force to take the lead on implementing programs that 
maximize forest health and carbon sequestration in line with the state’s climate 
change policies. 
Addressing the barriers to undergrounding requires a commission of 
experts who can reconcile: the nuances of the state’s wide ranging climate 
change laws and the Rule 20 program; permitting requirements of the California 
Environmental Quality Act, National Environmental Policy Act, Endangered 
Species Act, and other statutory restrictions; PG&E’s complex network of 
easements; the labor shortage for qualified line workers; and creative financing 
options. It also requires experts in supply chain and project management, who 
can unwind the various material, design, and labor costs associated with 
“trenching, conduit, substructures, cabling and connections, meter panel 
modifications, cutover work, and . . . removal from service of poles and wires,” 
which the CPUC states “represent all costs associated with the undergrounding 
 
 114. David R. Baker, Wine Country Fires: PG&E Often Diverts Money for Undergrounding Power Lines, 
S.F. CHRON., https://www.sfchronicle.com/business/article/Wine-Country-fires-PG-E-often-diverts-money-for-
12742239.php (last updated Mar. 13, 2018). 
 115. CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, AUDIT OF PG&E RULE 20A UNDERGROUNDING PROGRAM 34 (2019), 
https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/General.aspx?id=4403 (follow “PG&E’s Rule 20A program” hyperlink). 
 116. Counties of Mendocino, Napa, & Sonoma, Comments on the Scoping Memo of the Order Instituting 
Rulemaking to Consider Revisions to Electric Rule 20 and Related Matters 7 (Jan. 11, 2019), 
http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Efile/G000/M258/K310/258310682.PDF. 
 117. The COVID-19 outbreak in the United States erupted while this Note was already in the publication 
process. The United States, including the state of California, is experiencing unprecedented unemployment rates. 
As of May 2020, California has received 4.5 million unemployment claims with Governor Gavin Newsom 
predicting that “[u]nemployment numbers . . . will be north of 20 percent.” George Avalos, Coronavirus 
Unemployment: One-Fourth of California Workers Could Lose Jobs, MERCURY NEWS, https://www.mercury 
news.com/2020/05/11/coronavirus-unemployment-layoff-job-california-great-depression-newsom-tech-retail-
restaurant-hotel-construction/ (last updated May 12, 2020). 
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effort.”118 Doing so requires state intervention as the local municipalities, CPUC 
and PG&E are overburdened with other pressing matters, including those arising 
from wildfires; and the Wildfire Safety Division (WSD) and Wildfire Safety 
Advisory Board (WSAB), tasked with overseeing implementation of WMPs,119 
are not suited to reconcile the specific issues constraining undergrounding. 
C. THE CURRENT REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR IOU UNDERGROUNDING 
The Rule 20 program governs IOU undergrounding projects. Developed in 
1967, the program allows municipalities and utilities to designate projects for 
undergrounding, and it provides compensation to utilities for executing the 
project through credits that are approved as part of the utility’s general rate 
case.120 Approval of a Rule 20A project, the provision of Tariff Rule 20 
governing municipal projects, requires that the project be in the public 
interest.121 A public interest project is currently defined as one that: 
“[e]liminate[s] an unusually heavy concentration of overhead lines; [i]nvolve[s] 
a street or road with a high volume of public traffic; [b]enefit[s] a civic or public 
recreation area or area of unusual scenic interest; [or is listed] as an arterial 
street.”122 Under Rule 20A’s structure, municipalities are the drivers for 
undergrounding projects. That is, municipalities must identify projects, hold 
public hearings, consult with the utility to determine if a project qualifies for 
utility ratepayer funds, and designate Underground Utility Districts (UDD) by 
resolution.123 Rule 20A projects are often a result of organized neighborhood 
groups interested in undergrounding for aesthetic and property value reasons.124 
Notably, while Rule 20A’s criteria are limited and do not include wildfire 
mitigation, the CPUC specially approved San Diego Gas and Electric’s 
(SDG&E) consideration of wildfire risk as a criterion.125 In 2014, the CPUC 
issued Rule 20D—a SDG&E-specific rule governing undergrounding in areas 
SDG&E identifies as high fire risk and determines that undergrounding would 
reduce wildfires and ensure reliability of service.126 Communities that 
implement conversions pursuant to Rule 20D “receive 100% of utility 
funding.”127 
 
 118. CPUC Undergrounding Programs: Conversion of Overhead Electric Lines to Underground Facilities 
and Construction of New Underground Electric Lines, CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/ 
General.aspx?id=4403 (last visited June 28, 2020). 
 119. See infra notes 183–186 and accompanying text. 
 120. CPUC Undergrounding Programs, supra note 118. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. See CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, OVERHEAD TO UNDERGROUND CONVERSION PROGRAMS 8, 10–11 (on 
file with Hastings Law Journal). 
 125. Order Instituting Rulemaking to Consider Revisions to Elec. Rule 20 & Related Matters, Cal.P.U.C., 
No. R. 17-05-010, 2017 WL 2269097, at *10 (May 11, 2017). 
 126. Id. 
 127. Undergrounding Frequently Asked Questions, CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/ 
General.aspx?id=6442465120 (last visited June 28, 2020). 
1266 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 71:1251 
Rule 20 should facilitate the annual undergrounding of a reasonable portion 
of a utility’s network, but it does not. The CPUC estimates that the current Rule 
20A program costs ratepayers $1 per month with an average of $95 million of 
credits allocated annually to over 500 jurisdictions statewide.128 Yet, a 2016 
CPUC review of the program found that SDG&E was the only energy company 
that sufficiently utilized the program.129 SDG&E converts roughly fifteen miles 
of overhead lines per year and aims to relocate San Diego’s remaining 1000 
overhead utility lines within the next fifty-four years.130 San Diego’s 
undergrounding initiative is paid for with funds from the state’s Rule 20A 
program and a surcharge applied to San Diego residents’ utility bills, which 
generates $60 million annually and has facilitated San Diego’s acceleration of 
undergrounding.131 Furthermore, Rule 20 does not promote undergrounding in 
rural and suburban areas, which are predominantly the high fire-threat zones. 
Instead, the report shows that from 2011 to 2015 the majority of credits were 
allocated to the Bay Area, Los Angeles, Ventura, Orange County, and San 
Diego, which are predominantly urban counties.132 Significantly fewer credits 
were issued to the Central Coast, Central Valley, Desert, Inland Empire, North 
State, or Sierra Foothills.133 For instance, of the roughly $106.6 million of annual 
allocations that were made in 2015, less than $20 million went to municipalities 
in these high fire-threat regions.134 Moreover, between 2005–2017, nearly $760 
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million went to San Francisco, San Diego, Los Angeles, Long Beach, Oakland, 
San Jose, Chula Vista, Fresno and San Bernardino County.135 
Acknowledging the program’s failures, the CPUC issued a rulemaking for 
revisions to the Rule 20A program in May 2017.136 The rulemaking is ongoing 
and is assessing whether the criteria for public interest should be adjusted, how 
joint utility and telecommunications infrastructure poles can be migrated 
underground, and how to distribute credits and financing of undergrounding 
projects fairly across localities.137 Changes to Rule 20 are critical to promote 
modern public interest projects, but Rule 20 cannot alone solve the complexities 
of building a resilient power grid as it has not ensured timely completion of 
undergrounding projects on a schedule that comports with California’s climate 
change laws; nor does it facilitate the prioritization of undergrounding by 
utilities outside the Rule 20 program. 
D. INVESTIGATING THE COSTS OF UNDERGROUNDING 
While considerable, the actual cost of undergrounding may not be as high 
as PG&E’s estimates imply.138 For example, EEI reports that although utilities 
quote the cost of undergrounding each circuit mile to be in the millions, actual 
costs are dependent on a number of factors, including location and whether the 
installation is a new install or a migration of existing equipment.139 The EEI 
found that the average cost per mile for converting overhead to underground 
distribution ranged from $158,100 to $1.96 million in rural areas, $313,600 to 
$2.42 million in suburban regions, and $1 million to $5 million in urban areas.140 
Moreover, many utilities include the cost of installing new underground 
facilities in existing rates,141 and IOU capital projects often include a 25% 
overhead adder.142 Therefore, publicly available data on the costs of 
undergrounding are likely not precise.  
A recent independent audit investigating PG&E’s undergrounding 
program found that much of PG&E’s undergrounding costs were above industry 
standards.143 These costs were due to delayed project costs and inflated cost 
estimates approved in PG&E’s general rate cases.144 PG&E’s average cost for 
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migrating distribution lines from overhead to underground between 2007 and 
2016 was approximately $3.5 million for urban lines, $4.8 million for suburban 
lines and $2.5 million for rural lines.145 While the urban costs were within EEI’s 
maximum range, PG&E’s suburban and rural costs were 189% and 123% of the 
EEI category maximums, respectively.146 PG&E rationalized its upward costs 
because of increased population densities in suburban and rural regions.147 
However, the audit found much of the bloated costs stemmed from delays caused 
by poor project management. Shockingly, PG&E failed to track costs related to 
inactive projects that accrued material, labor, and overhead costs, rendering it 
impossible to separate real project costs from project delay costs.148 
Therefore, there is limited data on the actual costs of undergrounding 
PG&E’s network. Much of the roughly 20% of PG&E’s 106,681 circuit miles 
distribution network that is already underground149 was paid for by 
developers.150 Thus, the $243 billion undergrounding cost estimated above151 
does not reflect the potential savings resulting from developers undergrounding 
when rebuilding in areas destroyed by wildfires or migrating infrastructure when 
developing in existing communities.152 It also does not reflect that not all of the 
network can or should be migrated underground because of vulnerabilities due 
to flooding and earthquakes.153 Additionally, the simple dollar cost estimate 
does not factor in the reductions that may be possible by distributing costs 
among telecommunications and internet providers that piggyback on PG&E’s 
existing infrastructure. Nor does it take into account that some of the costs of 
undergrounding will be offset by PG&E’s rate of return on capital investments, 
which hovers steadily around 8%.154 
Intriguingly, PG&E and the state have resources to put towards the costs 
of undergrounding. For example, a portion of PG&E’s revenues could be put 
towards undergrounding, increasing the fixed assets of the company upon which 
stockholders would earn a rate of return. Even amidst the chaos of wildfires, 
PG&E’s 2018 electrical operating revenues were $12.7 billion, and the company 
generated “approximately $16.8 billion in total revenue.”155 Alternatively, 
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PG&E could sell property in its real estate portfolio;156 or after emerging from 
bankruptcy, PG&E could issue bonds for financing infrastructure projects. On 
the other hand, if the state wanted to capitalize on a jobs program, it could 
provide advances to PG&E or local municipalities from revenue bonds or the 
state’s Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund to contract undergrounding projects 
with third parties.157 Additionally, municipalities could redeem the $1 billion in 
currently unused Rule 20A allocations.158 Finally, federal programs such as the 
Federal Communications Commission’s Broadband Deployment Advisory 
Committee’s Dig Once initiative, which advocates for coordinated installation 
of fiber-optic cable, phone lines and power lines,159 offer options for distributing 
costs. Ultimately, determining how to cover the upfront costs of undergrounding 
is a task for the Governor’s commission of experts, drawing on their expertise 
in economics, accounting, and investment banking as well as environmental, 
energy, land use, local government, social justice, and state regulatory laws. 
E. AN AVERSION TO UNDERGROUNDING  
Despite Californians’ interest in undergrounding for safety, reliability, 
aesthetic, and property value reasons,160 the CPUC and PG&E exhibit an 
aversion for undergrounding. For example, PG&E routinely failed to prioritize 
undergrounding and to spend funds to implement Rule 20 projects. Illustrating 
this failure, the company has only depleted its undergrounding budget three 
times since 2000—the last of which occurred in 2006.161 Although PG&E has 
invested “more than $300 million” to underground overhead lines since 2012,162 
the company has failed to spend $150 million in budgeted funds for 
undergrounding since 2000 and instead has reprioritized the funds for 
undisclosed projects.163 Alarmingly, the audit of PG&E’s Rule 20 program 
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characterized this reprioritization, coupled with the company’s lack of reporting 
documentation, as indicative of fraud risk factors.164 Municipalities eager to 
proceed with undergrounding projects, therefore, find themselves up against this 
culture of disinterest, which leads to long project timelines and ballooning 
costs.165 
Further evidence of an aversion is that, in June 2020, the CPUC updated 
its public information on undergrounding emphasizing that it is “10 times more 
expensive than installing new distribution overhead lines” and “8 times more 
expensive than insulating (covering) the conductors (wires) to prevent them 
from igniting when contacting vegetation and other foreign objects.”166 The 
CPUC cites Southern California Edison’s (SCE) “assert[ion] that installing 
covered conductors and metal poles has a mitigation benefit-to-cost ratio that is 
significantly higher than . . . undergrounding . . . .”167 According to SCE, “full 
deployment of covered conductors and metal poles in [high fire-threat districts] 
are estimated to mitigate approximately 60 percent of fires associated with 
SCE’s electrical distribution facilities in [high fire-threat districts].”168 In 
contrast, “[u]ndergrounding theoretically would mitigate 100 percent of such 
fires, all else equal.”169 Therefore, even if covered conductors and metal poles 
were fully deployed, 40% of the current fire risk would remain. Significantly, 
the CPUC does not provide information about how SCE calculated the 
mitigation effectiveness-to-cost ratio. 
In addition, the CPUC does not verify IOU undergrounding costs.170 
Rather, to determine whether “IOUs provide ‘reasonable’ cost estimates for the 
various components of individual undergrounding projects,” the CPUC 
encourages municipalities to internally audit or utilize a third party to verify.171 
Moreover, the $3.8 million average cost per mile for undergrounding now 
provided by the CPUC is derived from the average of the low and high cost 
estimates provided by the IOUs.172 Importantly, the high end of the IOU ranges 
likely reflects the cost of undergrounding in a fully developed, urban 
environment like San Francisco or Los Angeles, which requires navigating and 
replacing as necessary existing underground infrastructure and strict permitting 
requirements. PG&E’s 2019 estimates range from $3.4 million to $6.1 
million.173 These estimates vary significantly from PG&E’s prior disclosures,174 
as well as SDG&E’s 2019 cost range of $2.64 million to $3.696 million per 
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mile,175 and SCE’s $3 million estimate used in its mitigation effectiveness-to-
cost ratio.176 
The deviation in cost estimates indicates that an independent body of 
experts is required to review utilities’ material, design, labor, regulatory 
compliance and permitting costs to determine a standardized assessment for 
reasonable costs, applying a holistic cost benefit analysis rather than a 
conventional and atomistic cost benefit analysis to determine the mitigation 
effectiveness-to-cost ratio. This is because many cities and counties see 
undergrounding as a practical, long-term solution to safeguard the public interest 
and require a defensible estimate of reasonable costs for undergrounding 
projects.177 Supporting this view and the viability of undergrounding, 73,500 
miles of distribution lines have been placed underground since the 1960s.178 
Thus, the cost of undergrounding cannot actually be cost prohibitive at all times. 
Therefore, it is time for an independent assessment of costs to be provided to the 
public, municipalities, CPUC, and policy makers so that the debate over 
undergrounding is not dictated by opaque and unexamined cost estimates 
provided by the industry.  
III. CALIFORNIA’S RESPONSE TO THE MEGAFIRES 
A. SENATE BILL NO. 901 (2017–2018) 
In response to the devastating loss of life and property, the rising costs of 
recovery and rebuilding, the outsized impact of megafires on the utilities’ ability 
to provide service, and the immense dangers of carbon emissions into the 
atmosphere and impacts on air quality, California lawmakers have taken steps 
to address the effects of climate change and megafires. In the fall of 2018, 
California’s legislature passed Senate Bill No. 901 (S.B. 901), the most 
sweeping wildfire prevention bill passed in decades.179 At the time, Governor 
Brown called S.B. 901 “absolutely necessary.”180 Introduced and authored by 
California Senator Bill Dodd, a representative of Napa, S.B. 901 aims to: 
improve forest health to reduce the risk of wildfires and greenhouse gases; 
enhance ecosystem function; improve wildlife habitats and water quality; 
increase water supply and carbon sequestration; and, importantly, reduce the 
cost to the state for rebuilding from and responding to wildfires.181 The act 
recognizes that, in order to reduce the risk and frequency of catastrophic fires, 
all stakeholders must take drastic steps to achieve that goal. Significantly, the 
 
 175. CPUC Undergrounding Programs, supra note 118. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Counties of Mendocino, Napa, & Sonoma, supra note 116, at 9. 
 178. CPUC Undergrounding Programs, supra note 118. 
 179. John Myers, As Climate Changes Worsens Wildfires, California Will Spend $1 Billion and Give 
Utilities New Ways to Shrink Their Fire Expenses, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2018, 11:20 AM), https://www.latimes. 
com/politics/la-pol-ca-wildfire-prevention-law-signed-20180921-story.html. 
 180. Id. 
 181. S.B. 901 § 1(g), 2017–2018 Leg. (Cal. 2018). 
1272 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 71:1251 
act requires agencies and departments across state government to take action 
within a short timeframe to update guidance documents, implement mitigation 
plans, and train personnel, all with the state’s climate change goals in mind. 
In addition to the law’s direct goals to protect California’s landscape and 
achieve the state’s goals for reducing greenhouse gas emissions, S.B. 901 also 
targets the practices of public utilities. For instance, the law governs utility 
contracting for private fire safety services,182 and includes measures for 
catastrophic wildfire ratepayer protection financing.183 While the law’s 
measures are critical of the utilities’ practices, the act declares that “California’s 
electric and gas utilities provide essential services to California residents and 
businesses, which are necessary to maintaining the vitality of California’s 
economy.”184 The legislature underscored that “[s]afe and reliable electric and 
gas utility service is vital to public health, public safety, air quality, and reducing 
emissions of greenhouse gases.”185 To ensure reliable service, S.B. 901 
mandates utilities “construct, maintain, and operate its electrical lines and 
equipment in a manner that will minimize the risk of catastrophic wildfire posed 
by those electrical lines and equipment.”186 
Each utility must submit a WMP for review by CPUC and CAL FIRE and 
that plan must then be formally approved by CPUC.187 The law provides, in part, 
that WMPs shall include: a description of responsible persons; objectives for the 
WMP, including prevention strategies and programs the utility will adopt “to 
minimize the risk of its electrical lines and equipment causing catastrophic 
wildfires, including consideration of dynamic climate change risks;”188 
protocols for de-energizing the utility’s network that consider public safety 
impacts;189 details of the utility’s vegetation management program;190 “plans for 
inspections of the [utility’s] electrical infrastructure;”191 identification of all 
risks for wildfires within the utility’s service territory;192 and plans describing 
how the utility will restore service following a wildfire.193 
Importantly, the law calls for details regarding the “[r]isks and risk drivers 
associated with design, construction, operations, and maintenance of the 
electrical corporation’s equipment and facilities”194 and the measures utilities 
will take to protect their systems and “achieve the highest level of safety, 
reliability, and resiliency.”195 Utilities are to ensure that their systems are 
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“prepared for a major event, including hardening and modernizing its 
infrastructure with improved engineering, system design, standards, equipment, 
and facilities, such as undergrounding, insulation of distribution wires, and pole 
replacement.”196 Importantly, utilities must demonstrate that they are adequately 
staffed to accomplish the requirements of Public Utilities Code section 8386 and 
their approved WMPs. S.B. 901’s requirements emphasize the state’s concern 
with the utilities’ ability to manage their networks in a manner that will 
significantly reduce the risk of catastrophic fire and prevent loss of property and 
life. 
As a follow up to S.B. 901, the legislature enacted Assembly Bill No. 1054 
(A.B. 1054) in the summer of 2019. The law reaffirms that “the state’s electrical 
corporations must invest in hardening of the state’s electrical infrastructure and 
vegetation management to reduce the risk of catastrophic wildfire.”197 The law 
provides many measures aimed at accomplishing this goal, including creation of 
a wildfire insurance fund intended to “support[] the credit worthiness of 
electrical corporations, and provide[] a mechanism to attract capital for 
investment in safe, clean, and reliable power for California at a reasonable cost 
to ratepayers.”198 In addition, A.B. 1054 established the WSD and the WASB to 
oversee development and implementation of WMPs.199 The WSD approves and 
audits the utilities’ WMPs.200 The WASB is comprised of seven members 
selected from “industry experts, academics, and persons with labor and 
workforce safety experience”201 that are to meet “no less often than quarterly” 
to provide guidance to the WSD regarding the contents of WMPs.202 
B. PG&E’S PLAN WILL NOT REDUCE CATASTROPHIC FIRES 
In its 2019 WMP, PG&E acknowledged that, because of the size and 
volume of its overhead power lines, the company faces high-risk and immense 
challenges.203 PG&E’s system includes the majority of California’s high-density 
forest area and has more distribution lines in high risk fire zones than any other 
utility in the state.204 Fifty-two percent of PG&E’s 70,000-square-mile service 
area is classified as “extreme (Tier 3) or elevated (Tier 2) fire-threat areas.”205 
To mitigate the fire threat, PG&E’s 2019 WMP utilized “a risk-based approach, 
meaning highest risk areas [would] be addressed first.”206 It outlined how PG&E 
planned to attack the growing wildfire threat by: enacting enhanced vegetation 
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management measures, which included removal of trees that have a high 
potential to fall, as well as removal of vegetation near power lines;207 expanding 
inspections; developing system hardening measures that include “replacing bare 
overhead conductor with covered conductor, select undergrounding” and 
upgrading equipment with low fire risk equipment and more resilient poles;208 
increasing situational awareness, meaning knowledge of environmental and 
weather conditions; enhancing controls to allow for remote reclosing; and 
expanding PG&E’s Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS) program.209 A CPUC 
guidance decision on this WMP stressed that current prevention measures do not 
adequately address ways to stop utility-caused wildfires and that the CPUC 
understands the need to increase efforts to reduce the risk of megafires.210 
A challenge to the feasibility of PG&E’s WMP is that the WMP objectives 
rely on the participation of third-party actors. For example, PG&E cautioned that 
all of its WMP objectives are contingent on cooperation by, but not limited to, 
property owners and environmental permitting agencies.211 Additionally, 
included in both the overview of PG&E’s system hardening program and 
vegetation management program were caveats that the estimated work and costs 
are related to the company’s ability to adequately staff the proposed programs. 
For instance, PG&E estimates that it will take nearly ten years to implement its 
system hardening program, which aims to upgrade 7100 circuit miles in areas of 
high fire risk by rebuilding the overhead distribution system, replacing assets 
that have aged past their useful date, and clearing vegetation near the system,212 
because of “constraints on available qualified personnel and materials.”213  
Further illustrating the fact that PG&E’s WMP is not sufficient to 
adequately reduce fire risk, PG&E submitted a second amendment to the 
company’s WMP on April 25, 2019214 that highlights the challenges the 
company faced in meeting its “ambitious goals.”215 In particular, the company 
underscored that its new Wildfire Safety Inspection Program (WSIP) criteria 
were much stricter than historical criteria and, accordingly, the company 
identified “greater numbers of necessary actions, which require additional 
resources.”216 Some of the amendments to PG&E’s WMP included: extensions 
of time to accomplish targets set by the WSIP program due to inclement weather 
as well as enhancements to programs that require obtaining additional land 
rights; an increased focus on de-energization; and a caveat that the company will 
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assess 100 million trees, but will only document those trees needing work.217 
Significantly, the company altered its timelines by replacing specific completion 
dates with open ended language.218 These amendments underscore the 
impracticalities of PG&E’s WMP. 
PG&E’s second amended filing coincided with comments made by 
California municipalities to the CPUC responding to the utilities’ WMPs.219 The 
cities requested that utilities work with them to make mitigation plans as the 
municipalities were particularly concerned with the utilities’ emphasis on de-
energizing. For example, the City of Moorpark underscored that de-energizing 
a distribution system would shift the burden to local government workers to 
perform activities typically done through electronic means, like directing traffic 
when traffic signals shut down.220 The City of Placerville echoed the sentiment 
of stressing the importance of proper communication between local 
governments and utilities. In particular, Placerville asked utilities to address the 
impact on cities not in a wildfire threat zone that must still endure the related 
outages from de-energization associated with a high-risk zone.221 In addition to 
calls for the utilities to work with localities and provide clarification on de-
energization, a number of cities and counties emphasized the need for increased 
undergrounding.222 
In approving PG&E’s 2020 WMP, the WSD acknowledged the concerns 
of the municipalities and included significant conditions for approval.223 For 
example, WSD found that the plan’s proposed expenditure of $9.54 billion 
between 2020 and 2022 will fail to adequately reduce the risk of fire without 
substantially improved vegetation management, grid hardening, risk analysis 
and resource allocation, and PSPS measures.224 In particular, PG&E’s 
“vegetation management work indicates there may be a problem with the quality 
of the work, as reflected by low pass rates of quality assurance checks . . . .”225 
Additionally, the plan fails to account for “external costs to the community 
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impacted by power shutoffs and assumes 100 percent wildfire mitigation where 
power is shut off.” 226 It also relies on the marketing phrase “smarter, smaller, 
and shorter” rather than detailed data to show how it intends to reduce the 
“number of customers affected by PSPS events by 30 percent.” 227 Significantly, 
WSD found that “the plan lacks significant details for the WSD to be fully 
convinced that PG&E will be able to execute on its plan fully and on time.”228 
Thus, as evidenced by PG&E’s WMPs, PG&E’s preferred mitigation 
measures are impractical for both PG&E and municipalities; meanwhile, 
undergrounding is still not a priority method at PG&E for mitigating the risk of 
wildfire. In its decision on PG&E’s 2019 WMP, the CPUC found that PG&E 
intended to use undergrounding for system resiliency in “rare cases.”229 Mr. 
Johnson’s December 2019 congressional testimony further confirms PG&E’s 
disinterest in undergrounding as it is only mentioned once in relation to system 
hardening projects and was not included in his action plan summary.230 
Moreover, PG&E’s Test Year 2020 General Rate Case states that 
“undergrounding is not a prominent feature of that funding request because of 
its higher cost to benefit ratio.”231 Additionally, PG&E’s 2020 WMP “does not 
separately report undergrounding from its overall $5.1 billion system hardening 
planned spend, making it impossible to determine how much PG&E spends on 
undergrounding and difficult to assess the various initiatives within this 
program.”232 This, despite S.B. 901’s requirement that each utility pursue 
undergrounding “to ensure its system will achieve the highest level of safety, 
reliability, and resiliency . . . .”233 
C. THE REALITIES OF IMPLEMENTING PG&E’S WMP 
PG&E’s WMPs will not ensure system resiliency nor do they adequately 
account for the full costs of PG&E’s preferred wildfire mitigation strategies. For 
instance, while vegetation management is a top priority, its vegetation 
management plan is unsustainable. Achievement of its goal, set in 2019, of a 
235% increase in vegetation management, requires maintaining a workforce of 
3000 qualified tree workers.234 To determine if that is even feasible, PG&E 
reviewed data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics for the entire “Tree Trimmers 
and Pruners” occupation, which showed national employment of roughly 41,000 
individuals with fewer than 6000 based in California.235 Furthermore, few of 
these tree trimmers are qualified to be line clearance certified, which is required 
 
 226. Id. at 13. 
 227. Id. at 53. 
 228. Id. at 5. 
 229. Order Instituting Rulemaking to Implement Elec. Util. Wildfire Mitigation Plans Pursuant to Senate 
Bill 901 (2018), 351 P.U.R. 4th 406 (May 30, 2019). 
 230. Hearing on Wildfires, supra note 19, at 3. 
 231. Undergrounding Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 127. 
 232. Letter from Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n to Stakeholders, supra note 225, at 17. 
 233. S.B. 901 § 38(c)(12), 2017–2018 Leg. (Cal. 2018). 
 234. PAC. GAS & ELEC. CO., supra note 95, at 82. 
 235. Id. at 82–83. 
July 2020] POWER LINES 1277 
for working next to power lines.236 Qualified personnel must also be able to scale 
the incredible heights of trees in PG&E’s service area, which further limits the 
pool of those who can be line clearance certified,237 making maintenance of a 
3000 tree trimmer workforce problematic. Moreover, the costs of vegetation 
management will only continue to rise as vegetation management requires 
annual maintenance, because—as we all know well—trees grow back.238 
Therefore, this annual expenditure will continue to increase as the company 
clears more miles of overhangs, driving the overall long-term cost of the 
company’s vegetation management program upward.239 
Adding to this unsustainability is the scope of the vegetation management 
strategy. PG&E estimates that it will take until 2026 to address the 100 million 
dead trees in PG&E’s service territory.240 Furthermore, even proper vegetation 
management can start wildfires as it did in the Butte Fire that erupted due to a 
downed tree which was weakened by previous PG&E vegetation 
management.241 In response to this reality, Santa Cruz, in its motion for party 
status for the Order Instituting Rulemaking to Implement Electric Utility 
Wildfire Mitigation Plans Pursuant to Senate Bill 901, requested that utilities 
invest in “measures that will have proven benefits” such as undergrounding.242 
The city cited that “Southern California Edison has already concluded, 
preventing contact with vegetation is difficult if not impossible.”243 Therefore, 
rather than rely on vegetation management, the city emphasized that “[t]he safest 
course is to design a system that can withstand contact.”244 Mr. Johnson 
reaffirmed this reality in his congressional testimony stating, “[t]o manage 
vegetation risks along our rights-of-way alone, PG&E has spent approximately 
$3.8 billion since 2009.”245 Although PG&E has met “state and federal 
vegetation and fire safety standards through routine vegetation management 
work,”246 the program has not prevented ignitions from vegetation. 
The challenges of accomplishing PG&E’s preferred mitigation strategies 
were also underscored in PG&E’s updated progress report for its 2019 WMP 
filed in compliance with Administrative Law Judge Sarah Thomas’ December 
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2019 ruling.247 The report shows that PG&E failed to complete enhanced 
vegetation management of 1000 circuit miles within the required timeframe. 
Although the company completed its goal five months later, the quality of that 
work scored 30% below the “92 percent ‘meets expectations’ performance” 
target.248 Additionally, the report shows that vegetation management, system 
hardening and the WSIP faced delays due to “a combination of factors, including 
inclement weather; the availability of equipment, materials, and qualified 
personnel; objections from property owners or governmental agencies; and 
environmental permitting requirements.”249 This indicates that PG&E’s 
concerns raised in its 2019 WMP regarding the feasibility of completing its plans 
have been realized.  
Likewise, de-energization is an inadequate mitigation measure due to the 
fact that PSPS events will quickly become politically untenable. De-energization 
of a utility network can effectively reduce the risk of wildfire to a community. 
Although it is the quickest and most cost-effective way for the company to 
reduce the risk of wildfires, it is not the best long-term solution for 
Californians.250 PG&E customers acutely experienced the consequences of 
PG&E’s prioritization of de-energization in the fall of 2019. In particular, the 
chaos and confusion surrounding the de-energizing of the Caldecott Tunnel, 
which straddles Alameda and Contra Costa Counties and is a critical transit 
artery for the Bay Area, consummately illustrated the unintended consequences 
of simply shutting off the power.251 There, PG&E failed to inform California 
Department of Transportation (Caltrans) that both counties might lose power, 
something Caltrans had never prepared for and thus did not have the necessary 
back-up generators in place to ensure continuation of service. This failure to 
communicate left thousands of commuters uncertain of whether they would be 
stranded going to or from work.252 In addition to commute disruptions, the PSPS 
events disproportionately impacted low-income Californians and other 
vulnerable populations that depend on reliable service for basic, everyday 
necessities such as lighting, air conditioning, and refrigeration.253 
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Following a poorly executed PSPS that left nearly 740,000 Californians 
across thirty-five counties without power for many days, Governor Newsom 
demanded that the CPUC open an investigation into PG&E’s de-energization 
practices and hold the utility accountable for the disruption caused.254 Governor 
Newsom underscored that “[t]his lack of preparation and poor performance is 
particularly alarming given that, prior to the event, PG&E responded to the 
scrutiny and questioning of multiple state and local agencies by asserting that it 
could handle a PSPS event without the need for additional assistance.”255 In 
addition to the impact the poor execution had on Californians, the full costs of 
the PSPS event are not yet known. However, Michael Wara, Director of Stanford 
University’s Climate and Energy Policy Program, estimated that “[a] PSPS for 
a representative 600 [thousand] accounts that lasted just [twenty-four hours] 
would cause $1.8 billion in costs.”256 If PSPSs are to be used regularly for 
multiple days at a time, over multiple years, the costs will add up quickly. 
Analysis of PG&E’s WMP and corporate attitude therefore illustrate that their 
preferred measures to reduce wildfire risk, vegetation management and de-
energization, are inadequate to safeguard public health, welfare, and the 
environment. 
Yet even if system hardening, vegetation management, and PSPS events 
were to accomplish the goals of S.B. 901, the new abnormal demonstrates that 
overhead power lines are an outdated technology. PG&E’s PSPS, issued on 
October 25, 2019, evidenced this issue, as the company cut power to an expected 
850,000 accounts in response to predictions of historic winds ranging from forty-
five to seventy miles per hour.257 The company warned that “[w]inds of this 
magnitude pose a higher risk of damage and sparks on the electric system and 
rapid wildfire spread.”258 As Mr. Johnson stated in his congressional testimony, 
“[l]ike any home, building or other infrastructure, electric transmission and 
distribution lines and related infrastructure are vulnerable to . . . winds over 70 
miles per hour.”259 A report published by Nature Climate Change provides 
evidence that this increase in high wind speeds will continue for at least a 
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decade.260 Commenting for an investigative report by the Wall Street Journal 
into PG&E’s safety culture and track record, retired CPUC Administrative Law 
Judge Janice Grau emphasized that both the CPUC and PG&E were unprepared 
for the change in winds and particularly the risks posed by Diablo winds.261 
Diablo winds pose high fire threats to the Bay Area and are characterized by San 
Jose State’s Fire Weather Research Laboratory as “California’s Critical Fire 
Weather Pattern.”262 Winds of such high speed and intensity dry vegetation and 
threaten the overhead power line system.263 
State legislators are recognizing the limitations of current mitigation 
measures and the public’s desire for undergrounding. Assembly Bill No. 281 
(A.B. 281), introduced by Assembly Member Jim Frazier of the 11th Assembly 
district, which includes Solano County and parts of Sacramento County, is 
winding its way through committee review.264 A.B. 281 would require utilities 
to underground power lines in high fire-threat areas.265 Senate Bill No. 584, 
introduced by Senator John Moorlach of the 37th Senate district, which includes 
portions of Orange County, would obligate the CPUC to develop matching fund 
programs to finance municipal undergrounding projects in Tier 3 districts.266 
Senate Bill No. 70 (S.B. 70), enacted in October 2019, requires that utilities 
include a description in their WMPs of “where and how the [utility] considered 
undergrounding electrical distribution lines within those areas of its service 
territory identified to have the highest wildfire risk.”267 S.B. 70 is a significant 
step in the right direction, but likely does not go far enough to ensure 
undergrounding is made a top priority at the utilities. At the time of writing, this 
law is seven months old and the practical impacts are not yet measurable; they 
will need to be studied in the context of the 2020 WMPs. 
The new abnormal requires more than the replacement of the current 
overhead distribution system to ensure Californians’ safety and accessibility to 
reliable power because the current technology is not suited for the new 
abnormal. Although this Note focuses on PG&E, the principles expressed should 
apply to all California electrical utilities. Even if the state expands reliance on 
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microgrids268 and distributive generation technologies269 in support of its 
greenhouse gas reduction goals, it will still need a reliable grid network.270 As 
we invest in the electric technologies of the future, why rebuild our grid in a 
century old model? As Mr. Weissman states, “we really only [use overhead 
power lines] now because it’s cheap. . . . The fact that there are now these very 
large liabilities for losses coming from failure of the lines, arguably that ought 
to change the way we assess the cost of these things.” 271 
CONCLUSION 
If Governor Newsom is serious about ensuring that Californians have 
“access to safe, reliable and affordable service . . . and that California continues 
to make forward progress on our climate goals,”272 then PG&E’s distribution 
network—of poorly maintained lines built nearly a century ago273—must be 
remade. While the upfront costs are expensive, the benefits of undergrounding 
greatly outweigh those costs by eliminating the sparks that ignite the megafires 
of the new abnormal. Utilities would save the annual expense of costly 
vegetation management, system hardening, drone and helicopter inspections, 
and the liabilities associated with being responsible for megafires.274 
Californians who may not have had direct connections to fire zones would no 
longer experience smoke-filled skies for weeks on end and power outages for 
days. Our state and its current economy, health care system, and greenhouse gas 
reduction programs cannot withstand decades of the new abnormal. Providing 
reliable electric service will require a regulatory system that approaches the 
state’s energy needs from a preemptive rather than a reactive perspective. The 
Governor’s commission of experts should provide the leadership for 
determining when, where and how selective undergrounding will be done. Their 
report should act as guidance for municipalities, utilities and the CPUC on how 
to implement undergrounding expeditiously in California. For environmental 
sustainability and public health reasons, a holistic cost benefit analysis shows 
that it is no longer reasonable to write off burying wires as too expensive. 
Selective undergrounding is cheaper and less costly to life and property than the 
horror and devastation of megafires. The urgency of climate change demands 
that the state take action to cause utilities to remediate obsolete technology, such 
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as overhead power lines, and to improve regulatory structures to ensure a 
resilient power grid able to withstand the new abnormal. 
